1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

4. 'IRAQ SOCIETY: THE TOWNS

During the span of a single lifetime, from 1830 to 1900, profound changes had come to pass in the urban society of 'Iraq. Most marked in the upper classes, but perceptible in the lower, they radiated from both outwards into a countryside still socially primeval.

Early in the nineteenth century 'Iraq town society had remained almost wholly isolated from Western influences. There was no acquaintance with the outside world. The tempo of life was that of earlier ages, traditional manners held the field, and life in every relationship was based on Islam. No restless progressiveness had appeared: the evils of the times were accepted by all with submissive fatalism. The impact of Western conceptions and activities upon this society was in the Levant gradual, in 'Iraq relatively sudden. Such ideas and phenomena came first to 'Iraq by way of the New Army which had, in a day, superseded Janissaries and Hayta bands: an army with Europeanized officers, soon followed by doctors, engineers, and the whole body of Westernized effendis. The senior officials, Turkish in speech and half-European in education, were accompanied by wives of Istanbul and children fresh from modern-fashioned schools. Posts and telegraphs, foreign trade and enterprise began to operate. The Christian and Jewish minorities, with their European leanings, continued to set a higher standard of education, aided by the missions which served them.

The cumulative effect of these influences had produced by 1900 an 'Iraqi urban society far removed from that of a lifetime earlier. Fed by the telegraph, an incipient press, and the resident foreigners, the talk amongst officials in the Saray, merchants and agents in the coffee-shop, notables in their diwans, could for the first time embrace wider interests. Literacy had become commoner, changes had appeared in domestic and social habit, European clothes were worn by an increasing minority, the tempo of life accelerated. The wealthy class increased in numbers as in possessions, and found fresh ways of spending. Social leadership was still on patriarchal or plutocratic lines; an intelligentsia scarcely existed; but among a widening circle the old acquiescence had begun to yield to dissatisfaction and questioning. An excessive confidence was felt in 'science' and modern knowledge, conceived always as a set of formulae with miraculous efficacy. Except where devotion to orthodox Islam and its endowments was a vested interest, there had been signs of diminished respect for that doctrine and for its professors; but this was still very far from a landslide to atheism, nor had the old standards of behaviour been yet abandoned even by the *évolués*.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

and when of tribal identity was rarely answerable, so short is tribal memory, so vainglorious its love of legend, so vague its sense of time and place. Some tribes were, evidently, consolidated groups of mere neighbours of the same valley or river reach—Zibari or Sawamara. Others sprang from a community formed at an oasis, well, or shrine, with all the accretions, soon assimilated, which a secure livelihood would invite. In others, the bond of original kinship, retained effectively by the ruling family, had been spread wider by intermarriage within the group, and was claimed in sentiment by hundreds of loyal adopted kinsmen admitted, over centuries, from without. Historical or imagined kinship was and is, indeed, the essence of the tribal nucleus.

The size of a tribe could vary from a few tents to great confederacies embracing, with greater or lesser integration, a dozen tribes all under a single paramountcy. But of no aspect of tribal life was it, or is it, more difficult to speak precisely than of the tribe's internal organization or solidarity, or lack of these. One authority is 'under' another only by virtue of admired qualities, birth, age, and consent; and such subjection is always unstable. The Western mind is for ever puzzled by the fragility of tribal authority, upon the skill and firmness of which everything in the tribe would seem to depend.

Amid their many elements of variety, the tribes were uniform in the fundamentals of their outlook, their level stages of evolution, their common feeling of distinctness from the governed townsfolk; and their power for good or evil was enhanced by the remarkable range of personalities whom the scope of their free society allowed to emerge. Whatever the townsman of Baghdad or Mosul might feel about the wildness or avarice of his tribal fellow countrymen—whom he would reluctantly admit as such—he must needs confess the force and individuality of many of the Shaykhs: qualities found equally in a great Shaykh of desert 'Aniza or Shammar, the lord of a few sordid reed huts in the Ḥammar Lake, an Amir of the Rabi'a or Zubayd, or the Aghā of a Kurdish countryside.

For all the tumult of their restless politics and feuds, the tribes' material and social state in 1900 might well seem to an observer fundamentally unchanged for centuries. Yet in fact changes had been long at work: the same, in essence, as were moving among the town populations, and due to the same impacts of the time. The Turkish conception of government had changed, control of tribal areas had replaced mere tax-farming as the objective, modern military forces had become available. Even tribesmen could not be ignorant that Courts had been set up which at least claimed universal jurisdiction, criminals were demanded from their tribal refuges, a Mudir and his handful of *Zaptié* (*ḍhabṭiya*) could appear

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

from a headquarters no longer distant, telegraph lines could be seen, postmen rode from town to town. A dozen new townships had been founded in the last decades of the century—Naṣiriya in the Muntafiq, 'Amara in the lower Tigris, Kut and Bughayla as river-steamer fuelling points, and new-built Khans with gendarme posts along the main routes. The control of the greater canal heads had become a Government function; more and more the local Governor became the invoked arbiter of tribal quarrels; and the Tapu land records with their registration of communal tribal lands as the private property of the Shaykhs had introduced a new and jarring relationship of landlord and tenant to mar that of chieftain and loyal follower.

Other and less obvious elements were at work to modify the old tribal isolation. Increased awareness of the outside world came with the visits of grain-buying merchants' agents, since the steamship had made bulk export possible. The effects of shipping itself radiated inland from Baṣra and from the Tigris steamboats. European manufactured goods penetrated into every tribe; and the buyers, the effendis, the *Zaptié* and the city populace whom a tribesman might rarely visit, were themselves reflectors, in their kind and degree, of a faint light of Western innovation in the world of speech, ideas, and comparisons. Few of the foreign travellers of the 'nineties failed to comment on the social progress of the last quarter-century and on the greater penetration by Government of the outlying regions.

The Dhafir in the south-western desert, astride the route into Najd, lived on bad terms with ibn Rashid and raided the Muṭayr and 'Aniza. The 'Aniza, greatest of nomadic groups of northern Arabia, held the Shamiya desert from Najf to Hit. Their chief, ibn Hadhdhal, titular Qa'immaqam of Razaza, now courted and now imprisoned by the Turks, pursued his ancient feuds with the Shammar, and flouted the Government. The Dulaym were by 1900 largely settled and in part disciplined by the chain of police posts along the Aleppo road.

The Shammar had long passed their great days of formidable unity. Intermittently at war with an outstanding personality of the time, Ibrahim Pasha of the Milli Kurds—bandit, patriarch, general of Ḥamidiya, protégé of Sultan 'Abd al-Ḥamid—they were bitterly divided by factions among the sons of Farḥan Pasha, and could play off the authority of Mosul against Dayr al-Zur, loot the river traffic, withhold their taxes, and alternately court and reject the favours of Government.

On the lower Euphrates the power of the Sa'dun overlords over a complex of Shi'i tribes was in division and decline. For a generation two separate schools of leadership had appeared: the attempt

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

439 still divided between the British and the local Jewish firms. Of the former, those with offices at Basra in 1914 were Messrs. Lynch, Gray Mackenzie, Strick, and the Basra Trading Company, with the American firm of MacAndrew Forbes handling liquorice. At Baghdad British firms were Lynch, Blockey Cree, and Sassoon of Bombay. Attempts were twice made by an Englishman to found a tailoring business. The Imperial Ottoman Bank had branches at [453] Baghdad and Basra under French or Anglo-French control; the Imperial Bank of Persia appeared, only to disappear again as being unwelcome (to its rivals) in Turkish territory; the Eastern Bank opened in Baghdad in 1912. The local currency remained stable, paper money still unknown, and exchanges predictable. Much damage to trade was done by Walis' unwise instructions in the direction of price control and of prohibition on the export of foodstuffs in the supposed interests of 'Iraqi consumers. Nothing stopped shameless hoarding by the rich in years of scarcity.

369 Outside the towns and placid suburban areas the picture of
• 178 tribal near-anarchy painted by foreign travellers and residents in the
579 'Iraq of 1900 to 1914 is a painful one. But though it is true that standards of security were low, lawless episodes despairingly repeated, and Government forces never adequate, conditions had been much worse in the past. The many new townships and police posts, increasing traffic, wider cultivation, and (for better or worse) greater Government penetration showed substantial advance from the conditions of the previous century. It was in part misleading that quicker communication tended to ventilate throughout the country episodes formerly of mere local interest. Standards, too, with the Europeanization of Government and the increased foreign interests, had become more exacting: the activities of raiders or bandits were counted scandalous where, years ago, they had passed as normal and unremarked. The tribes were more subdivided and thus weakened; resistance to Government by a united tribe was ever rarer. The shaykhs increasingly became involved in town life and politics, and Government decreasingly willing to close its eyes to tribal disobedience; direct administration was the order of the day, and for every day and place in which tribal violence was reported there were long periods and wide spaces of calm.

619 The Shammar, torn by their own rivalries and at perpetual feud
721 with the Milli and 'Aniza, presented until 1909 the complete picture of desert restlessness. Thereafter, the fall and death of Ibrahim Pasha Milli redressed the balance in Shammar favour; the Milli disappeared as a formidable unit, the northern 'Aniza alone disputed Shammar ascendancy. But their successful robberies did little to strengthen the tribe, whose official shaykh the Turks changed annually; and an outbreak of fighting with the

1r Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

III

WAR AND BRITISH OCCUPATION

I. MIDSUMMER 1914

Too few countries in the world were greater changes brought by the events of 1914 to 1918 than to 'Iraq. Severed from the Ottoman Empire after four centuries, it witnessed a change of overlord, from Oriental Muslim to Western Christian: a profoundly different spirit and effectiveness in its administration: the admission of vastly strengthened modernizing influences in society and politics, with new economic opportunities; a changed world orientation, with a transformed status and fresh problems in world affairs: and the entry of a flood of the light of European publicity and detailed familiarity with its peoples, places, and conditions. With all this, the more backward parts of its population—and these formed the great majority—were to pursue lives relatively unaltered, while the profounder problems of 'Iraqi economics and politics continued to lack solutions which, more than a generation later, have not yet been devised.

The moment from which these unforeseen and unforeseeable innovations were to date invites, therefore, certain speculations involving the comparison of fact with might-have-been.

The position reached by the 'Iraqi people and their Government by midsummer 1914 was one whose evils of insecurity, backwardness, and poverty were plain to see, and have been sufficiently described. But there were, less obviously, fair grounds also for some optimism. If the tribes had evolved little, urban society was clearly advancing under influences of relative enlightenment or modernity which seemed on balance beneficent. In politics, confined as they were to a small minority, Arab nationalism had taken a firm hold and would certainly persist; to all its varying votaries it was exciting, new, significant; and the linking of the movement in 'Iraq with those of Syria and Egypt had well begun. Such nationalism did not preclude the survival, in a high proportion of the old Sunni families and the Ottomanized bureaucracy, of pro-Turkish sentiment loyal to the ancient ways.

Nationalism apart, there were powerful elements in 'Iraq hostile to Government as such. These were certain to resist its greater efficiency, by whomsoever developed. The tribes had barely glimpsed the possibility of a rule which could provide them with irrigation water, secure their markets, stop bloodshed amongst them, heal their sick; more generally the Dawla remained the

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

Najd oases and south-western 'Iraq began to move freely, and although the mixed Commission for which 'Iraq pressed was not established, the frontier authorities of both sides established friendly contacts.

7. LIFE AND GOVERNMENT, 1921–6

These first five years of the 'Iraq Kingdom built into reality a large measure of the dreams of the earlier nationalists: they saw erected an authentic fabric of 'Iraqi self-government, while steps were taken in every department of national life and government towards the establishment of a modern State. The services of the ablest 'Iraqis from every province were enlisted to the task. The beginnings of a sense of national self-consciousness, in loyalty to this Kingdom which was their own, were forthcoming from elements, albeit still minority elements, of tribe and countryside quite unaccustomed to such conceptions. Administrative ability, it appeared, was available and capable of improvement; and the practical help of 'Iraq's ally on every level, from League politics to a nahiya squabble, was ever at her service. The British part in the Administration, pronounced 'interference' or 'imperialism' by some of the press and resented at times by impatient 'Iraqi functionaries, was exercised with patient discretion by nineteen-twentieths of the British officials. With an occasional maladroitness, it was predominantly helpful and always disinterested; but, necessarily and desirably, it diminished as the years passed, as advisory and executive functions could be more clearly distinguished, and as districts or departments were seen to run successfully under all-'Iraqi Administration. 'Iraqi-British social relations grew into habitual cordiality, often into close friendship. The Turkish régime, four centuries long, faded into the past, and 'Iraq accustomed itself to a new cultural and political orientation, even while so many features of its old characteristic social and economic life endured.

There have been frequent references to the great constructive services of the King and of the High Commissioner. Both were served at this period by able and devoted staff officers: the King by Rustum Ḥaydar, a cultured French-educated Syrian but adopted 'Iraqi, by Taḥsin Qadiri, and by others both loyal and competent in the Court service. The High Commissioners similarly were fortunate in their staffs; these included in this earliest period as Counsellors, C. C. Garbett, followed by B. H. Bourdillon: as Legal Secretary, Nigel Davidson: as Oriental Secretary, Miss Gertrude Bell,[1] whose sudden death in July 1926 was a tragic

[1] In the period 1925–32 Bourdillon was succeeded as Counsellor, in 1929, by Hubert Young: Davidson by Barclay Nihill: and Miss Bell by Vyvyan Holt.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

unaltered in the influence still wielded by many shaykhs in their tribes, the continued possibility of 'tribal outbreaks', the persisting backwardness of the ignorant and credulous tribal mind, and the sadly low living standards of the apathetic poor with their malnutrition, disease, and brevity of life. Yet, and not least in the twenty years since Independence, there had been change in directions which may, to summarize them, be treated as fourfold. The first was economic; thanks to better irrigation control, more State and private assistance in agriculture, and better communications, there had been progress, however humble and precarious, towards security of livelihood. The second change was psychological; it was shown by the partial expansion of the tribal mind to include some part of the interests of an outside world now brought within reach by easier travel, livelier commerce, the spread of Government's social services, wireless receiving-sets, and the increased use of Western fabrics and utensils: every new survey, census, police inquiry, telegraph line, or canal alignment was a step away from the old tribal seclusion. The third element of change lay in the penetration of the countryside by State forces now, as never before, mobile, well equipped, and ubiquitous; using communications inconceivable before, they could in a day anticipate and disperse the disobedient in the remotest areas. The tribes were in fact now, for the first time and for ever, militarily helpless. Finally, detribalization itself had made further steps in that inevitable progress which, in 'Iraq as in Scotland, must no doubt end by reducing the tribes or clans as such to mere picturesque survivals evocative of nostalgic pride. By 1950 greater approximation to the non-tribal public had offered interests and loyalties which could compete with those of the old tribal nucleus: stability of residence, safety from raids, and Government ubiquity gave less and less place for leadership on the old lines, and the new economics of agriculture had in many cases substituted a contrary grouping and new allegiances. The shaykhs, no longer appointed or recognized by the State, were often themselves deputies or haunters of Ministries, lived largely in Baghdad or their local liwā headquarters, and had departed far from tribal austerity in their addiction to city pleasures, while their sons could go, and went, to higher studies and Western sophistication at Beirut, Cambridge, or Columbia. The picture of the 'Iraqi tribal world in 1950 is, indeed, that of an early but not the earliest stage of an uneasy, perhaps unhappy, transition from an archaic, remote, and static condition towards the civilization—itself transitional and unformed—of the country at large and of its cities. The coalescence of tribal and tribeless folk had well begun; and, whatever were its continued backwardnesses, 'Iraq in 1950 could for the first time expect from its tribal groups not, as of

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

old, mere trouble and recalcitrance, but a contribution both economically and politically valuable to a modern State.

In the towns, an observer of conditions in 1950 was faced with the same dilemma as in the tribes: how extensive was the change, if any, which fifty years had brought about? Outwardly at least, it was considerable. If some parts of the towns were as narrow, airless, and planless as of old—if the same donkeys carried the same goods for sale amid the flies and jostling of the same bazaars—yet in the main traffic streets and the new quarters all was changed and unrecognizable; and modernized surroundings, with the public State services now maintained, could not but contribute to the sum of urban well-being. All the larger towns had improved approaches, modern suburbs ranging from a few villas to whole areas of planned streets, planted boulevards, public gardens, and modern public buildings[1] immensely superior to those of Ottoman Turkey, few and cheaply constructed as these buildings had been forced to be.[2] Street-cleaning services were—save perhaps in the labyrinth of an 'old quarter'—not inadequate; streets were well maintained, increasingly paved, and widened where possible. Town planning schemes were under execution with the inclusion, or the hope, of house-building developments for the working poor and for Government officials; and private enterprise in building was encouraged by the improved security, the well-kept title-registers, the development of town amenities, and the need for outlets for safe investment. In the capital a modern omnibus service—the autonomous Baghdad Passenger Transport Board—supplied all needs and would naturally be, as in Baṣra it had been, imitated in the provincial towns. Taxicabs were everywhere abundant and in Baghdad had nearly, but not quite, driven the ancient *'arabana* from the streets. Traffic control was excellent. Steel or masonry bridges had in many places besides Baghdad and Mosul replaced the primitive pontoon river crossings. Modern shops had come year by year into existence, and could provide buyers of all classes with all but exceptional needs. Hotels offered a near approach to normal European service. The cinema was well established; American, European, and Egyptian films were shown in some sixty picture-theatres throughout 'Iraq. Efficient fire services existed in the principal towns, and had well justified themselves. Systems of piped water and electrical installations for power and lighting had been constructed in all larger towns; the

[1] The mausoleum of King Faysal I, built in 1934–6, is usually accounted the finest modern building in 'Iraq.

[2] Large sums were however allotted by the Development Board to building projects for the period 1951–6: for hospitals and health institutions, ID 5,400,000: for schools, 5,400,000: for other public buildings, 5,250,000: and for housing (officials and the poor), 1,650,000.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

latter, which had their following of enthusiasts, were hampered by lack of playing fields and of funds and, perhaps, by some survival of conservative apathy. Sport,[1] in fact, non-existent in 'Iraq two generations earlier save for tribal games and wrestling, was still far from taking, even among the young, the leading place in popular interest which it occupied in Europe and America. Horse-racing—as elsewhere, half sport and half business—was well supported; it was regulated by law, adopted modern totalizator arrangements, stands and amenities, and was organized by two companies. Of these, successors of a series of Racing Clubs and Companies from 1918 onwards, one maintained a course in the New Baghdad suburb, the other on the royal estate now under development. Hunting and polo were the amusements of a small coterie of Army officers and the rich, under the Regent's patronage.

The immense increase in mobility and travel for all but the poorest had had strong social and psychological effects in modifying the old parochialism and encouraging wider interests. The same is true of the visits paid annually by thousands of the well-to-do to Turkey or Syria, the Lebanon, or Europe; these, as areas of escape from summer heat, were increasingly preferred to the 'Iraqi hill-stations[2] in Kurdistan which offered only coolness and scenery in austere conditions. An expenditure exceeding ID 2,500,000 on summer resorts and rest-houses formed in 1951 part of the six-year plan of the Development Board.

Although illiteracy and deep ignorance were still widespread in the towns and vastly predominant in the tribes, yet two world upheavals, fifty years of immensely increased Western contacts, easy travel and communication, conspicuous material development, an abundant press, broadcasting, greatly multiplied schools, and local and national politics had done much to modify the old isolation of the lives and minds of the poor, and had increased incomparably, among the literate classes, their knowledge of the world and the times. Such knowledge, too often superficial and distorted, was nevertheless a world away from that of the 'Iraqi effendi of 1900 both in content and in the extent of the social range of those affected. Disinterested higher learning was still rare and, theology apart, was confined to a bare dozen students of local history or

[1] Games played were football, basketball, volley-ball, badminton, boxing, athletics, wrestling, weight-lifting, table-tennis, darts, and chess. For the first two of these, various, including national, leagues and championships were organized. 'Iraqi skill at their chosen sports was excellent.

[2] These, dating from the late thirties, were Ṣalaḥ al-Din (formerly Pirmam) with a large hotel and private houses for hire; Shaqlawa and Ḥajj 'Umran with small hotels; and Sursink, with a medium hotel and a royal lodge which made it the most fashionable. All were accessible by passable roads.

1f Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

642 186 character described on an earlier page (p. 227). Claimed as the chief of virtues, it remained, at its worst, damaging to confidence and progress, conducive to ill relations with 'Iraq's best foreign well-wishers, and more apt to involve the country in the disasters of other States than to benefit its own poor and backward masses. 642 182 648* The third factor was the heterogeneity of the public, with its widely varying levels of evolution, its regional loyalties, and its strong sectional pressures—Shi'i or Kurdish, landowning or 'intellectual'. A fourth was the disruptive or distracting effect of recent blows (due to no fault of the 'Iraqis) which had fallen untimely on a State and society still politically rootless and immature: the loss of Faysal I, the powerful irritants of the brief Nazi empire and of the Palestine Question, the rancours and cleavages of the Second World War; these were unmerited trials to a young State, and had gravely unsettled it.

178 182 Behind all these forces could be felt the spiritual uncertainties and vacua of a people still culturally and intellectually unsure as between Eastern and Western values, between tradition and innovation, Islam and atheism. They were the more distressing, and the more dangerous, at a time of bewildering international menace in which far older and greater Powers felt scarcely surer how to conduct their affairs. 'Iraq was suffering from the malaise, frustrations, and fears of a period of rapid dangerous transition, in which it was all the harder to find its paramount requirement, 000 tranquillity. In so far as the nation's own conduct could conduce to this, it was to be sought by processes and qualities easy to describe, difficult but not impossible to realize—the gradual and organic strengthening of its institutions, the increasing enlightenment and coalescence of its public, the uplifting of the living-standards of the poor, loyalty and restraint in its armed forces, the conduct of its foreign and especially its domestic policies with reason, integrity, and continuity. By such means the 'Iraq people might by their own efforts achieve such fortune and happiness as human limitations and the conditions of a disordered world, of which they were inescapably members, might allow.

423 But occupying cultivators in the South, while recognising tribal allegiance and the State's legal ownership (raqaba) of the land, commonly
579 regarded their tribal group as possessors of the soil by immemorial right, whatever the period of its occupancy of the land might in fact be. They frequently resented any demand for mallakiya, and indeed any claims to overlordship other than those of the State. It should not be assumed that in such disputes one side was invariably unjustly acquisitive or the other side obstinately recalcitrant. Each party doubtless thought that substantial justice lay on its side. Circumstances alter cases and it is neither possible nor useful to generalise on the point. It is the removal of the injury caused by these longstanding differences, alike to agricultural prosperity and to public peace, that is the objective, not the justification or satisfaction of particular disputants. As is well known this need was so strongly impressed on Government by recurring violence along the Hai and in the Muntafiq, occasioned by the perennial disputes arising out of the differences mentioned, that a law regulating the investigation and settlement of the conflicting claims in these areas was enacted two years ago and is now in course of application.*

621 In the northern rainfall zone the people generally lived in regular
622 villages, under the shadow of a local *agha* or other notable, and cultivated the soil and pastured their flocks round about. As there was ordinarily
423 more land than men to till it, land was brought under cultivation as
178 required and successive generations commonly tilled the same groups of parcels, alternating fallow with sown. When necessary, the local leader became the intermediary between the people and any central Government that could make itself felt. Thus he compounded for the village tithe ('ushr) and collected appropriate contributions from the cultivators. He settled land disputes in village conclave or otherwise, and his jurisdiction to do so was of no material importance so long as these mediæval conditions prevailed. As civilisation developed, towns became more attractive and communications improved, such local leadership sometimes tended to become absentee landlordship; while with the introduction of tapu tenure many village areas appear to have been wholly or partially registered as the personal possessions of local notables, without any consideration of the immemorial rights of those who had regularly occupied and tilled the land or pastured their flocks thereon. The pinch in these cases seems to have been mainly felt when the lands were pledged, and forfeited, to town-dwelling merchants for debt. The personal touch and interdependence that existed between even the most arbitrary local chieftain and the village cultivators appears not infrequently then to have been replaced by more mechanical efforts to exploit the land from outside and by obstruction to such efforts from within.

423 These generalised instances are only intended to serve as illustrations of the evil effects of granting tapu tenure in the past without a thorough study and due safeguard of previously existing rights. No comprehensive or detailed study of these cases is possible here.

5. When the maps from which Plates I and II were prepared were in process of compilation the Tapu Department did its best to show the location and extent of all land held under tapu tenure. Partly owing to the destruction of records by the retreating Turks, but much more owing to the inherent defects of their Land Registry methods, it was not found possible generally to do more than indicate approximately the outside limits of patches of territory thought to be affected. The maximum limits of these groups of territory will be seen, on reference to Table I, to cover about 40,000 square kilometres. It is impossible to say what proportion of the areas included would prove upon due investigation to be reasonably entitled to be held in tapu tenure.

*Law for the settlement of disputes of Muntafiq Lands. No. 23 of April 4, 1928.

The influence of these confederations waxed and waned with changing personalities and circumstances. The original tribes (ashaiyir) of el 'Iraq were, of course, pastoral nomads following the grass with their herds of camels, sheep and goats. As throughout history generally, when they found that cultivation was economically advantageous they began to settle. Without going into earlier happenings, it is evident that the Ottoman Government were never in a position to exercise any systematic control of the large areas of miri land throughout the country. Under the conditions that commonly prevailed the authority of the Government ran slowly outside the larger towns, while for the most part the effective local and social units were the tribal confederations or their component groups. These groups, larger or smaller according to circumstances, occupied and used such areas of land as they desired and were able to hold against rivals. The territorial hold of tribal groups naturally varied in stability. It varied with the varying power of rival or associated groups and their need for the land. And it was doubtless always amenable to special exertions of authority on the part of the Central Government. But subject to such vicissitudes, innumerable tribal groups exercised the effective control of miri land from day to day throughout the majority of the country.

When land was brought under cultivation a prescriptive right to such occupation was usually asserted. These claims were not limited to the parcels actually tilled, for cultivation shifted annually to offset the exhaustion of the soil and in response to other variables, while provision for prospective cultivation was also included. Such provision for the future was of particular importance in the rice areas, where the rice-growing fringes of the land encroach slowly year by year on the marshes. In these valuable tracts the rivalry between adjoining tribal groups is now intense and calls insistently for competent independent regulation in the general interests of rice cultivation and the orderly development of the steadily advancing waterways. Elsewhere, apart from favoured spots, where special facilities for irrigation or fruit-growing exist, there is still a dearth of the agricultural population needed for the development of the country.

Prescriptive claims to pasture wandering flocks and herds still remain more extensive than such claims to cultivation: and, although they preponderantly apply to the bordering desert and steppe, they also affect the regularly cultivated areas. Indeed the right to browse flocks on immature barley (ghasil) is still widely practised.

All these customary prescriptive claims to rights of cultivation or pasture, may be asserted long after the uses on which they are based have ceased. Thus I heard of numerous cases of tribal groups who had migrated from one district to another, possibly many years ago, and yet on due occasion advanced prescriptive claims to the area they had abandoned as stoutly as they maintained their right to the lands they had since occupied and used. These occasions were usually some favourable change in the conditions of the abandoned area, e.g. the provision of irrigation facilities previously lacking. It need hardly be suggested that deliberate voluntary abandonment of the use of an area for any purpose should extinguish any prescriptive claim to such use.

5. A great impulse has been given to the permanent settlement of the tribesmen during the last decade by the improvement—almost the creation—of communications, by the growth of law and order, by the installation of pumps throughout the riverain tracts, and by the taste for modern civilisation induced by such things as motor cars, gramophones, better dwellings, more frequent visits to towns. Throughout the countryside the camel hair tent of the Bedu' has been giving way to the

K6 178 reed mat hut, and the mat hut to the mud, or even the burnt-brick building. This movement has naturally been accompanied by a weakening of tribal cohesion and tribal authority, as the machinery of the provincial administration of Government has penetrated into the less accessible regions and as increasing numbers of the population have been brought individually in touch with local provincial officers over their daily affairs.

166 423 651 619 The development of direct dealings by the local provincial officer (mudir) with small landholders and cultivators in his sub-district (nahiya) over land and land revenue questions has naturally tended, wherever it has been in operation, to transfer the effective control of miri land increasingly from tribal influence to such officers. In many liwas I was afforded evidence of the numbers of smaller men paying their land revenue directly to provincial officials and occupying the position of smallholders, either as heads (sirakil) of minor tribal or other farming groups, or even on a more individual footing. And everywhere I was advised tribal disintegration was accelerating, everywhere the tribesman was becoming an individualist and wanting his individual holding. The movement is not, of course, new. Under Turkish administration it no doubt proceeded wherever the authority of Government was effective; but its range was necessarily more circumscribed and the impelling forces much less. Nor can it be counted upon to continue. If the provincial administration deteriorated again some reversion to, and strengthening of, tribal influences would be natural.

423 619 4. In the numerous discussions that have taken place during recent years regarding the legal recognition of customary prescriptive claims to miri land, more particularly in connection with the installations of pumps, the term *lazma* came to be generally applied to these claims. So far as I have been able to ascertain, the term lazma was applied in Turkish times, among other words, to the customary prescriptive claim of the tribe to land already mentioned. It was represented to me that this might be more correctly and explicitly defined as a right of occupation and cultivation (haq el sakna wa zira'). Within the area concerned the tribal or sub-tribal sheikh would allot the land to adult males of the tribe according to tribal custom, and to be held subject thereto. There was no personal lazma right. Allotments to individual tribesmen could be, and frequently were, resumed by the sheikh.

423 Since the war the conception of a tribal or sub-tribal lazma seems to have weakened and that of a corresponding prescriptive claim of an individual or smaller group to have been to some extent substituted. The appropriateness of the term in the latter sense is disputed; but regarded as a label for any prescriptive claim to occupy and hold miri land, it seems to have held the field and to have been commonly understood and accepted.

423 427 According to prevailing theory all holders of miri land are tenants at will of the State. The land is supposed to be leased by an annual terminal agreement (shartnama). In practice, although such agreements may, and do, exist, they are far from being an indispensable, or even an ordinary feature of the occupation and use of miri land, even in districts most completely under central Government control. And it is not pretended that any annual review is made, with renewal or cancellation even of such agreements as do exist, still less that any systematic record and control of the innumerable theoretical leaseholders of miri land throughout the country is maintained. Indeed the mere administration of any such annual leasing of the numerous, enormous and widely distributed parcels of miri land is beyond the ability of any central

8:Campbell T-5 (no date) 1949 MH1 Iraq MH1

178 Life in the tribes is changing year by year. The pumping
406 engines owned by every tribe send thousands of tons of
871 the brown waters of the Euphrates down the irrigation channels to make the land fertile and green. Education is spreading to the tribes, and an increasing number of tribesmen hold jobs of every sort in the railways, the port, and the oil companies. Many tribesmen from the Euphrates drove trucks on the great Aid to Russia route through Persia during the war. Others could be found serving the Allied war effort as far apart as Masira at the end of the Persian Gulf and Haifa.

With this development going on all around him, it is not surprising that the amusements of the tribesman are changing. Whereas before he had to amuse himself by listening to stories told by amateur but skilled storytellers, he can now pass the evening listening to a wireless set driven off the battery of his sheikh's or his sirkal's saloon car, or better still, he can jump a bus or lorry into the nearest village and watch an Egyptian, Indian, or American film. In this atmosphere it is not surprising that the stories are dying out, and now only a few of the older men know them. These stories fulfilled a need in the days in which the tribes were in constant conflict with the Turkish Government, and in which facilities for written Arabic literature did not exist. Now, in more prosperous times, they must die out. I would stress that the stories were never considered as belonging to any great school of Arabic literature—they were simple little things, either originated by the tribesmen themselves or adapted from some more ancient story, and their intention was merely to evoke a smile on an arduous march, or to help pass a cold desert night; and so they must be judged.

000 To those who want the real beauty of a precise language, I say that this can be found in written classical Arabic,

8:Campbell T-5 (no date) 1949 MH1 Iraq MH1

Arabic) is sometimes known as Bet al Maqadas, or the Holy House.

Cousin. Page 44, Line 13. 'Has she a cousin?'

The right of a man to ask for his cousin in marriage is still maintained in the tribes. Should the girl or her parents not desire the marriage it may be necessary in some cases to compensate the man for the loss of his right. Family opinion is also a powerful factor tending to force a man to marry his cousin. In spite of all this, however, the bulk of marriages are between different families, and a surprisingly large number of marriages would appear to be between different tribes. The railway is increasing this tendency, as a man gets employment away from home and frequently marries a girl in the area in which he is working. I remember meeting tribesmen driving lorries in Persia who expressed the desire to take back a Persian wife, but who were anxious about the reception she might meet at their homes. I am told that some did in fact do so, concealing the girls on their lorries when crossing the frontier at Khaniqin.

6. The Story of the Lost Soul

Page 60, Line 17. 'A caravan from Persia carrying bodies for burial.'

The majority of Persians are of the Shia section of Islam, so wealthy families send their dead to Iraq for burial. The usual custom is for families to come on pilgrimage to the cities of Kerbala, Nejf, and Kadhimain, and to bring the body for burial at the same time. This is many months after the time of death, for Iraqi health regulations now ban the import of recently dead corpses. The body is therefore buried in Persia near to the place of death and dug up when in condition to travel. It is no uncommon thing in a Persian graveyard to see a wooden stretcher lying on top of a tomb to indicate that the family intend to send the body for bur...l in holier soil, though it appears that poverty or forgetfulness after the passage of months often interfere with the actual journey. However, the sight of Persian pilgrims putting a coffin on to the train at Maqil Railway Station is not an uncommon one. Should the family themselves not be able to travel they might have to rely on agents, but it would be the duty of the dead man's eldest son to go with the body if unavoidable circumstances, such as military service or the lack of a passport, did not make it impossible.

15: Tannous N.G-5 (no date) 1951 M1 Middle East M1
IRAQ M#1
Syria MD1

equipment, and the livestock. In reality the cultivator's share amounts to less than that, for he has to make certain contributions to local functionaries and to the agent of the landlord.

There is also clear evidence that unless the system is checked effectively at its roots, it will continue to perpetuate itself. Witness what has happened during the last 50 years or so. Irrigation has been expanded materially, mainly through pump installations, and total agricultural output has been increased tremendously; but the peasant has remained landless and impoverished. In general, he does not possess the ability or initiative to prove his legal claim to the newly developed land. In many cases, even when his right of ownership is recognized, the cultivator is not able financially to maintain the costly pump installation. He is obliged to work on a share basis with one who is able to supply the necessary capital and equipment, be he the chief or the merchant. Gradually, these become the owners of the land, and the original occupant becomes permanently a landless sharecropper. Through this process the virile and integrated tribal community of Iraq is being transformed into a demoralized agricultural settlement, under the control of an absentee landowner chief.

Syria affords another illustration of the magnitude of the problem. We witness here practically identical conditions of absentee ownership, sharecropping, and low levels of living among the peasants. The manner in which this system threatens the future of agricultural development in Syria is clearly indicated by recent happenings in the Jezira area. This has tremendous possibilities for irrigation and for dry farming. It is sparsely populated, and until recently has been utilized mainly for grazing by nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes. During the last few years cultivation has been expanded rapidly in the area. Modern machinery has been put on the land in large numbers, and bumper grain crops have been harvested.

On the surface, this appears to be the beginning of sound development. Upon closer examination, however, we encounter a different reality. The tractor has been put on that fertile soil mostly by speculators and absentee owners. Concern about the ultimate exhaustion of this great national resource is not upper-

20: Hourani S-5 (1945) 1947 M1 Middle East
Iraq MHI

development of an Iraqi nationalism, regarding all Iraqis without distinction as equal citizens of the State. 641 563

These two tendencies are not necessarily opposed to one another except in their extreme forms. A Pan-Arab would generally concede the value of local feeling provided it is kept in its proper place; an Iraqi nationalist would not oppose Iraq's membership of the Arab League. They differ not in essence so much as in emphasis. This difference, however, is important; and it is clear that the future of the minorities will be greatly affected by which of them prevails. If the exclusive Iraqi nationalism prevails, the way will be open for all minorities to become full citizens, although this will not save them from the necessity of at least some degree of assimilation. If Pan-Arab sentiment prevails, then a serious Kurdish problem may arise; and a Christian problem as well if Pan-Arabism is not dissociated from Islamic feeling. 668

The Kurds: Description

The Kurds form a compact community with a local majority in the north and north-east of Iraq. Most of them are concentrated in the liwas of Mosul, Irbil, Kirkuk, Sulaimania and Diala. The regions which they inhabit are largely mountainous, and a great proportion of them are nomadic or semi-nomadic pastoral tribesmen, pasturing sheep, goats and other animals, moving up the mountains in the summer and down again in the cool weather. Others of them, however, are farmers in the plains and valleys, who cultivate wheat, fruit, rice and tobacco; not all the farmers however are wholly settled, some of them being semi-sedentary. 563 221 [241]

Most of the Kurds are Sunni Moslems, although a minority belong to extreme Shi'i sects. Again, most of them preserve their Kurdish language and customs, although in certain districts they are bi-lingual and a few tribes are in process of being Arabized. Their language is not unified so much as a group of dialects, some of which differ partly from one another. Similarly, they themselves do not form a single community but a group of tribes. Among the wholly settled Kurds the tribal organization is becoming weaker, but in the mountains it is still very strong, and in general it is true to say that tribal loyalty is stronger than any other. The tribesmen, like most mountain peoples, are restless under civil government and positive law. They willingly 563 619 178

20: Hourani S-5 (1945) 1947 M1 Middle East
Iraq MHI

563 acknowledge no law except their own customs, and no leadership
619 except that of their chief families, some of which, like the Baban
178 family, were virtually independent princes in Ottoman days.

Tribal feeling is still, as it has always been, stronger than Kurdish national feeling; and the Kurds have never formed a nation, still less a nation-state. In the last generation or so, however, new factors of unity have been arising. One is the growth of a Kurdish town-population. In the past the Kurds tended to leave commercial crafts to Jews and Christians, but now a Kurdish burgeoisie has appeared, in whom tribal loyalties are weaker and national ideals stronger. Another factor is the emergence of a Kurdish intelligentsia. Its education has been mainly non-Kurdish: Turkish in the days of the Ottoman Empire, Arabic and Western in the present generation; in consequence many of the educated Kurds have been assimilated to the Turks or Arabs. The majority, however, have remained Kurds, and have begun to develop a modern Kurdish press and literature, with its centres in Baghdad and Sulaimania. They are in contact with the centres of Kurdish life in Syria, Persia, Turkey and the Armenian Soviet Republic, and are forming and spreading the ideas of Kurdish independence and unity.

The Kurds under the Mandate

648 Before the war of 1914–18, the majority of the Kurds were
563 subject to Ottoman rule. It was natural, therefore, that the Allies should favour the idea of Kurdish autonomy: an ideal embodied in the Treaty of Sèvres (1920), which provided for local autonomy for the Kurds still to be left in Turkey, or, if they themselves desired it, an independent state to include the Kurds of the Mosul Vilayet, of which the disposal was still undecided. The Treaty was never carried out, and was replaced in 1923 by that of Lausanne, which said nothing about a Kurdish State or about autonomy for Turkish Kurdistan. In the meantime, an Iraqi Government under British Mandate had been established, and, as it had been found impossible for economic and other reasons to establish a separate government for the Kurds of the Mosul Vilayet, it had been decided to incorporate them in the unitary State of Iraq. On the whole, the Kurds of the Mosul, Irbil and Kirkuk regions accepted this, but those of Sulaimania did not. In 1922 they revolted under the leadership of Shaikh Mahmud. The revolt was only with difficulty suppressed; and it was not

44:Matthews and Akrawi S, G-3 (1945-1946)1949 MI Middle East
IRAQ MHI

Chapter 9

PUBLIC PRIMARY EDUCATION

*872

FREE public primary education extends over six grades and is offered to any Iraqi child who has reached the age of six years. In theory, primary education is compulsory in areas where adequate facilities exist; in practice, in the few instances in which the Ministry of Education has declared attendance to be compulsory in given areas, social and economic conditions, together with inadequate planning, have made the ruling ineffective.

Except for certain modifications in schools in Kurdish or Turkish districts, or in the few so-called "model rural primary schools," the primary course is uniform throughout Iraq. Thus, a child moving from one district to another, from urban to rural or tribal district, is not handicapped by basic variation in the curriculum.

To a large extent, primary education segregates boys from girls, with boys schools taught by men and girls schools by women. The Ministry of Education, however, has made considerable progress in recent years, especially in the cities, in overcoming the traditional prejudice against coeducation. In 1933–34 the Ministry opened kindergartens, later called "junior schools," which admitted both boys and girls and employed women teachers. In the larger cities, particularly in Baghdad, the kindergartens soon were enlarged to include first- and second-grade classes. Rather hesitant about adding classes at first, the Ministry was encouraged by the popularity of this experiment to enlarge the program. By 1938–39 junior schools had sprung up in the capitals of almost all the provinces, and in spite of the war these schools continued to flourish, increasing in number and attendance until in 1944–45 there were 56 schools attended by 8,512 children, 4,322 boys and 4,190 girls. At the present time the typical junior school consists of the first four grades and parallels the work of those grades in the public primary school. A few junior schools offer a five- or six-year course. Apart from these planned coeducational schools, coeducation at the primary level is tolerated in many rural villages where no girls schools or only incomplete ones exist.

[562
178]

59: Allen et al S-3 (1952-53) 1953 Mi Middle East
Iraq m#1

000 and write to obtain more information. Most rural people have not yet learned such
369 fundamental principles as crop rotation to enrich the land, the concept of germs,
or the principles of infection and contagion. Under their circumstances they
311 have not been able to acquire a growing store of knowledge or of experience to pass
down for the advancement of each successive generation. In other words, the people
of rural Iraq have had little cultural heritage or growth.

5. Attitudes and Social Organization

369 Also fundamental to their poverty are attitudes derived from their social
366 position and relationships with their sheikhs and landowners. Virtually imprisoned
by their condition of total dependence and debt, rural people have developed deep
181 feelings of powerlessness and futility. Many of these attitudes stem from a
178 weakening of historical tribal relationship in which there were greater reciprocal
obligations between leaders and the people. Now they become unbalanced when the
traditional tribal social system degenerates as sheikhs abandon their tribal
responsibilities and take tribal lands as their personal possessions. The
tribesman becomes detached from his social group. His dependence becomes greater
upon the whims of his sheikh. This leader feels less and less obligation as the
state and local governments assume those responsibilities for the welfare of the people
which the sheikh formerly performed.

III. THE REQUIREMENTS FOR IMPROVEMENT OF RURAL PEOPLE

000 A. A PROBLEM REQUIRING TOTAL GOVERNMENT ACTION

The causes of the rural problems as briefly described obviously indicate that nothing less than a full scale attack upon them by all ministries and agencies of the government will bring about the desirable changes and improvements. Economic and social development of the rural people is not only necessary for their own welfare but for the welfare and progress of Iraq as a whole. A national economic and social development programme for rural peoples under the co-operative planning and direction of government leaders is needed. This programme should integrate into single, national, social plan of action the present and planned government activities of land and water development. The provisions should include as well as new plans for making ownership of farms available to tenants and landless people, credit, accessible to these small farmers at reasonable rates, instruction in new agricultural practices, establishment of public health and professional medical services available for all people, provision of education for every child, advice and demonstration in the improvement of housing, instruction in home and child care, establishment of social services for the needy, ill, blind and orphaned, construction of access roads to allow marketing of farm products from every village, development of village industries and the organization of communities for participation in an ultimate direction of their local affairs. This will take time, effort, money, careful study and planning, and increased inter-ministry and agency co-operation before it can be put into effect. The information and skills now exist to undertake this national campaign. It is a programme on which national leaders and with technical assistance from abroad can unite in their thinking and their efforts to build a solid agricultural economy as the foundation of Iraq.